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Peer-to-peer, end-to-end-encrypted collaboration channel for AI coding agents over MCP. The relay never sees your data.
A secure channel that lets two AI coding agents on different machines work as one.
Quick start · How it works · Tools · Security · Architecture · Contributing
A covalent bond is two atoms sharing a pair of electrons. Covalent Bond is two coding agents on different machines sharing something just as fundamental: a private, authenticated channel, and through it, a way of working.
Picture two developers pairing across a distance. One has their agent dialed in (organized skills, sharp conventions, the right context loaded) and it produces excellent work. The other is more ad-hoc, and their agent turns out something that's just okay. Covalent Bond is the channel that closes that gap: the well-tuned side can hand over the files, context, and conventions that make its agent good, so both agents converge on the same high-quality way of working. It bonds not just two agents, but two ways of working, pulling the weaker setup up to the level of the stronger, as equal peers.
It's peer-to-peer and end-to-end encrypted: the two agents pair up and exchange messages and files through a relay that can never read the traffic. It works with any MCP-compatible agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Windsurf, Cline, and others), exposing bond_* tools over the Model Context Protocol. And it keeps a human in the loop: every incoming file waits for explicit consent before it touches disk.
It doesn't magically clone one setup onto another. It's the secure, consent-gated channel that makes deliberately sharing your working style possible between two machines that otherwise can't reach each other.
Shortcut: let your agent set everything up. Paste docs/AGENT-SETUP.md to any coding agent and say "set up Covalent Bond". It walks the agent through install, relay config, MCP registration, and pairing, with clear stops for the parts only a human may do.
Or do it yourself on both machines (steps 1–2), then pair (step 3).
Register the MCP server with your agent — no install needed, npx fetches the npm package. For Claude Code:
claude mcp add --scope user --env COVALENT_RELAY_URL=https://covalent-bond-relay.gopalrajsuresh.workers.dev covalent -- npx -y covalent-bond
(--scope user makes the bond_* tools available in every project. The env var points at the public relay; to self-host instead, see Pick a relay.)
For other MCP clients (Cursor, Codex, Windsurf, …), this standard stdio-server config works in most of them; paste it into the client's MCP settings JSON (the top-level key is usually mcpServers or servers):
{
"mcpServers": {
"covalent": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "covalent-bond"],
"env": {
"COVALENT_RELAY_URL": "https://covalent-bond-relay.gopalrajsuresh.workers.dev"
}
}
}
}
On Windows, if your client struggles to spawn npx directly, wrap it: "command": "cmd", "args": ["/c", "npx", "-y", "covalent-bond"]. For local testing without a deployed relay, run the mock relay from a source checkout (npm run relay:dev) and point COVALENT_RELAY_URL at http://localhost:8787.
git clone https://github.com/gopalrajsuresh/covalent-bond.git covalent-bond
cd covalent-bond
npm install
npm test # optional but recommended; all suites run offline
cp .env.example .env # PowerShell: Copy-Item .env.example .env
The .env already contains the public relay URL. Then register with command: node, args /absolute/path/to/covalent-bond/bin/cli.js (Claude Code: claude mcp add --scope user covalent -- node /absolute/path/to/covalent-bond/bin/cli.js), no env var needed.
Restart your agent session, then verify: ask the agent to run bond_status. It should reply "No active session", which means the tools are live.
Pair and share
bond_connect → you get a code like AbCd-1234-XyZw.bond_join.bond_status → Secure channel established → send files (bond_send) and messages (bond_message). Incoming files wait for the human to bond_accept.bond_end on both sides.Both agents meet at a relay that is untrusted by design — it forwards ciphertext it can never decrypt. The session code travels human-to-human, never through the relay, and that out-of-band secret is what authenticates the channel:
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Agent A (host)
participant H as Humans (out-of-band)
participant R as Relay (untrusted)
participant B as Agent B (guest)
A->>A: bond_connect → session code
A-->>H: code shared by chat / voice
H-->>B: code entered on the other side
B->>B: bond_join(code)
A->>R: ephemeral public key (routing ID only)
B->>R: ephemeral public key (routing ID only)
Note over A,B: key = X25519 ⊕ session code → AES-256-GCM
A->>R: ciphertext
R->>B: ciphertext (relay sees nothing else)
B->>B: file held until human runs bond_accept
If anything in the middle tampers with the key exchange, key confirmation fails and the session aborts before any data flows — a malicious relay can't read or impersonate either side.
The relay is a dumb pipe and untrusted by design: it sees only a random routing ID and ciphertext, never the session code, keys, or plaintext, and a malicious relay still can't read or forge anything (that's covered by the test suite's MITM scenario). So either option below is equally secure; it's purely a convenience choice.
Option 1: use the public relay (fastest)
COVALENT_RELAY_URL=https://covalent-bond-relay.gopalrajsuresh.workers.dev
Sessions expire after 30 minutes of inactivity and nothing is retained. Best-effort availability, rate-limited.
COVALENT_RELAY_URL (either place works; a real environment variable wins over .env).env file (simplest): copy .env.example to .env in the covalent-bond folder and edit the value. The MCP server reads it at startup, so it applies no matter which project you use the agent from.
MCP client config: pass it when registering the server, e.g. for Claude Code:
claude mcp add --scope user --env COVALENT_RELAY_URL=https://... covalent -- node /absolute/path/to/covalent-bond/bin/cli.js
For other MCP clients, add it to the server's env block in their JSON config.
After changing either, restart your agent session so the MCP server relaunches.
Option 2: deploy your own in ~2 minutes (free Cloudflare account)
npm install -g wrangler
wrangler login # opens the browser; create a free account if you don't have one
cd cloudflare-worker
wrangler deploy # prints your relay URL: https://covalent-bond-relay.<your-subdomain>.workers.dev
Then set COVALENT_RELAY_URL to that URL on both machines. Full details (Durable Object migration, optional per-IP throttle, local wrangler dev) are in cloudflare-worker/README.md.
Paste this to any coding agent running in this repo:
Deploy my own Covalent Bond relay: install wrangler if missing, run
wrangler loginand wait for me to finish authenticating in the browser, thenwrangler deployfromcloudflare-worker/, and tell me the URL to set asCOVALENT_RELAY_URLon both machines. Followcloudflare-worker/README.md.
The only manual step is the browser login; the agent handles the rest.
bond_connect and returns a code like AbCd-1234-XyZw.AbCd-1234-XyZw." → the agent calls bond_join.bond_status shows Secure channel established, start sharing: "Send src/auth.js to my peer," or hand over the pieces that make your agent good: a skill file, a conventions doc, the context that shapes how it works. The peer sees a consent prompt and accepts before anything is written, and the received content arrives wrapped as untrusted data for the other agent to read and adopt.bond_connect — Create a session and get a shareable session codebond_join — Join a session using a code shared out-of-bandbond_status — Connection status, pending transfers, and new eventsbond_send — Send a file to the connected peer, encrypted end to endbond_message — Send a short encrypted text message to the peerbond_wait — Long-poll for the next peer eventbond_accept — Accept a pending file transfer after human consentbond_decline — Decline a pending file transferbond_end — End the session and disconnect from the relayFull reference:
| Tool | Parameters | What it does | Requires |
|---|---|---|---|
bond_connect | — | Create a session as host; returns the code to share out-of-band | — |
bond_join | sessionCode | Join a session with a code (XXXX-XXXX-XXXX, Base58) | — |
bond_status | — | Handshake state, pending transfers, unread-event count, and events since the last call | — |
bond_send | filepath, message? | Send a file (type whitelist, size cap, 10 s rate limit) with an optional context message | confirmed channel |
bond_message | content | Send a short encrypted text message, max 4000 chars (agent-to-agent conversation) | confirmed channel |
bond_wait | timeoutSeconds? | Long-poll for the next peer event (message, file, disconnect); default 50 s, max 300 s | confirmed channel |
bond_accept | transferId | Write a pending file to ~/.covalent/incoming/ and return its content wrapped as untrusted data | human consent |
bond_decline | transferId | Discard a pending transfer (the sender is not notified) | human consent |
bond_end | — | Disconnect and clear session state, including pending transfers | — |
? marks an optional parameter. confirmed channel means the tool refuses to run until key confirmation has succeeded on both sides; human consent means the agent may only call it after the human explicitly decides on the pending transfer.
Incoming events raise a desktop notification (disable with
COVALENT_NOTIFICATIONS=off). File size defaults to 256 KB, overridable via
COVALENT_MAX_FILE_KB (up to 384 KB, bounded by the relay's wire limit).
Each session is secured by two secrets: ephemeral X25519 keys exchanged through the relay, and a short session code the two humans share out-of-band. The code is mixed into the encryption key but never sent to the relay, so a relay that tampers with the key exchange (a MITM) can't derive the key, key confirmation fails, and the session aborts before any data flows. The relay only ever sees a routing ID, public keys, and AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Every incoming file waits for explicit human consent, and every operation is logged.
Full details, threat model, and handshake diagram: docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.
Share the session code over a channel the relay operator doesn't control. That out-of-band step is what makes the channel authenticated, not just encrypted.
npm test # all suites, via test/run-all.js, against an in-process mock relay
No network or wrangler needed. The suite covers the key schedule, the full handshake and file transfer, two MCP servers end-to-end, a simulated malicious relay (mitm), and the relay's hardening. See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md for the breakdown, and docs/TWO-MACHINE-TEST.md for a real two-machine run.
The relay is a Cloudflare Worker in cloudflare-worker/ with one Durable Object per session. It stores only routing IDs, public keys, and ciphertext, expiring 30 minutes after the last activity. It can't decrypt anything.
Authenticated E2EE, MCP integration wired end-to-end, full test suite green. Pre-1.0: the protocol and API may still change.
Contributions are welcome. Start with CONTRIBUTING.md, which includes the security invariants and the branch/PR workflow. To report a vulnerability, please use the private process in SECURITY.md, not a public issue.
MIT; see LICENSE.
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