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Multi-account Google MCP server for Claude Code: Gmail, Drive, Calendar, Sheets, Docs, Contacts, Search Console, and mor
A local MCP server that gives Claude Code (and any MCP client) access to your Google Workspace — Gmail, Drive, Calendar, Sheets, Docs, Contacts, Tasks, Meet, Search Console (plus optional Forms, Chat, and Workspace Admin) — across multiple Google accounts at once.
Open-source and funded by IdeaCrafters — the studio that pays for its development and upkeep.
npx; everything configured through env vars.v5 is local + user-OAuth only. Service accounts and hosting (and the APIs they unlock) are on the roadmap. Upgrading from v4? Jump to Upgrading.
You need Node 20+, a Google Cloud OAuth client (~2 min — setup below), and a random 32-byte key.
# 1) install
npm i -g mcp-google-multi
# 2) put your config + creds in the environment (see "Configuration").
# Easiest for a quick try — export them, or drop a .env in your working dir:
# GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET, GOOGLE_ACCOUNTS, MASTER_KEY, GOOGLE_PROFILE
# 3) authenticate each account (opens a browser; one-time per account)
mcp-google-multi auth --account work
mcp-google-multi auth --account personal
# 4) register with Claude Code
claude mcp add google-multi -s user -- npx -y mcp-google-multi
Restart your MCP client and the tools appear. Tokens are written encrypted to ~/.config/mcp-google-multi/tokens/ (override with TOKEN_STORE_PATH) — useless to anyone without your MASTER_KEY.
Generate a key: openssl rand -base64 32.
A plaintext .env is fine to try it out, but for a daily driver, don't leave GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET + MASTER_KEY on disk — inject them at launch from a secrets manager. The server just reads process.env (it has no idea where the values come from), so wrap it with Infisical:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ~/.local/bin/mcp-google-multi-run — chmod +x, then register this as the MCP command
set -euo pipefail
export INFISICAL_TOKEN="$(infisical login --method=universal-auth \
--client-id "$YOUR_CLIENT_ID" --client-secret "$YOUR_CLIENT_SECRET" --plain --silent)"
exec infisical run --projectId <project> --env prod --path /mcp-google-multi \
-- npx -y mcp-google-multi
claude mcp add google-multi -s user -- ~/.local/bin/mcp-google-multi-run
Now the only thing on disk is the encrypted token store. Pass the token via the INFISICAL_TOKEN env var (as above), not a --token flag, so it never shows up in ps. (Any secrets manager works — Doppler, Vault, 1Password CLI, etc. — the pattern is the same.)
| Env var | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID / GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET | ✓ | OAuth Desktop client from Google Cloud |
GOOGLE_ACCOUNTS | ✓ | alias:email,… — e.g. work:you@co.com,personal:you@gmail.com |
MASTER_KEY | ✓ | base64 32-byte key that encrypts the token store (openssl rand -base64 32) |
GOOGLE_PROFILE | — | write policy: read-only (default) · safe-writes · full-writes |
GOOGLE_READ_ONLY | — | true = hard kill-switch for all writes |
GOOGLE_WRITE_ALLOW / GOOGLE_WRITE_DENY | — | glob overrides, e.g. calendar:*, *:delete* |
GOOGLE_OPTIONAL_SCOPES | — | extra bundles: forms, chat |
GOOGLE_ADMIN_ACCOUNTS | — | aliases granted Workspace-admin scopes (the account's own super-admin OAuth) |
GOOGLE_TOOLSETS | — | all (default) or a CSV filter of: gmail, drive, calendar, sheets, docs, contacts, searchconsole, tasks, meet, forms, chat, admin |
TOKEN_STORE_PATH | — | override the encrypted token dir (default: ~/.config/mcp-google-multi/tokens) |
DISCOVERY_CACHE_PATH | — | override the Discovery-doc cache dir (default: ~/.config/mcp-google-multi/discovery) |
GOOGLE_TRIM | — | off (or 0/false/no) disables compact JSON serialization of tool responses |
Inspect the resolved setup any time: mcp-google-multi config check.
The server does not dump ~170 tool schemas into your model's context. At boot, tools/list exposes only one small {service}_discover tool per service (plus nothing else). Calling e.g. drive_discover returns that service's operation catalog (name, one-line summary, arguments, read/write class), reveals the operational tools, and emits notifications/tools/list_changed so the client re-fetches the list. An optional query argument filters the catalog.
Hidden is a listing concept, not a security boundary: operational tools stay callable at all times (existing prompts that call tools directly keep working), and write-control + OAuth scopes remain the real enforcement. Use GOOGLE_TOOLSETS to switch entire services off — it is a filter only: listing forms/chat/admin does not enable them without their GOOGLE_OPTIONAL_SCOPES / GOOGLE_ADMIN_ACCOUNTS gates.
Every read tool's account argument also accepts "*" (all configured accounts) or a CSV subset ("work,personal"). The server runs the call once per account (bounded concurrency) and returns per-account results — one account failing never hides the others:
{ "results": [
{ "account": "work", "ok": true, "data": { /* … */ } },
{ "account": "personal", "ok": false, "error": { "error": "auth_required", /* … */ } }
],
"partial": true }
Fan-out is read-only by design (write tools take exactly one account), and the three read tools that save files to disk (drive_download, drive_export, gmail_download_attachment) are excluded so parallel accounts can't clobber the same path. account_list shows what's configured: alias, email, token health (ok / expired_refreshable / needs_reauth / missing / decrypt_error), and granted-vs-configured scopes — without ever touching token values.
drive_transfer copies or moves a file between two of your accounts: server-side share+copy when possible (the temporary read grant on the source is revoked right after; the copy gets a clean name, never "Copy of"), download+upload as the fallback. move: true trashes the source after a successful copy — that part is delete-gated by write-control, so safe-writes can copy but never move. Comments, revision history, and permissions don't transfer; if the fallback has to change the format (Drawings export as PNG), the result is flagged lossy and a requested move keeps the source intact. Native files over Google's 10MB export cap and binaries over 1GB can't take the fallback path.
Two eager tools cover everything the curated set doesn't: google_api_search finds any method in Google's API Discovery index (including APIs with no dedicated tools here, like Slides), and google_api_call invokes a method by its Discovery id (drive.revisions.list, slides.presentations.create, …) with path/query params and a JSON body. Calls run through your account's OAuth client and the same write-control policy as named tools: the read/create/update/delete class is derived from the method's HTTP verb and name (POST deletes like batchDelete/clear count as deletes), and policy globs/GOOGLE_TOOLSETS match the same service names as named tools (people counts as contacts, admin_* as admin; slides/driveactivity/drivelabels/groupssettings have no named service and are always available).
Discovery documents are fetched from Google on first use and cached on disk for 7 days (DISCOVERY_CACHE_PATH, default ~/.config/mcp-google-multi/discovery); a stale cache is used when offline.
Tool responses are serialized compactly (no pretty-print token tax; set GOOGLE_TRIM=off to restore pretty JSON), and the fat readers ship sensible caps with per-call escape valves. The caps are per-call controls (full / maxChars) and are NOT affected by GOOGLE_TRIM:
drive_read returns up to maxChars characters (default 100k) with truncated/totalChars/offset for paging — this also bounds Google Doc exports, which can reach 10MB. (Non-Google-native files over 2MB are still rejected with too_large, not paged.)gmail_read / gmail_read_thread cap each message body at 50k chars (bodyTruncated + bodyTotalChars flags); pass full: true for the whole body.calendar_list_events / calendar_list_instances trim descriptions to ~300 chars and drop empty/audit fields (created/updated) in list view; calendar_get_event always returns the full event.Reads are never gated. Every create/update/delete is off until you opt in — pick a profile:
GOOGLE_PROFILE | Allows |
|---|---|
read-only (default) | reads only |
safe-writes | create + update (deletes still blocked) |
full-writes | everything |
GOOGLE_READ_ONLY=true overrides all. For fine control: GOOGLE_WRITE_ALLOW="calendar:*, sheets:update*" and GOOGLE_WRITE_DENY="*:delete*" (deny wins). mcp-google-multi config check prints the resolved policy and exactly which tools are enabled.
~170 tools across Gmail, Drive, Calendar, Sheets, Docs, Contacts, Search Console, Tasks, Meet, and (optional) Forms, Chat, Workspace Admin. Full per-tool list → COVERAGE.md. Every tool takes an account argument matching one of your aliases.
http://localhost:4242/oauth2callback.v5 is a breaking change, but the migration is a one-time, ~2-minute step:
npm i -g mcp-google-multi@latest (or update your client config).MASTER_KEY to your environment (openssl rand -base64 32) — now required.mcp-google-multi migrate-tokens (reads your old tokens/<alias>/token.json and encrypts them) — or just re-auth each account.GOOGLE_PROFILE=safe-writes (or full-writes) to keep writing. (GOOGLE_ALLOW_ADMIN_WRITES is gone — replaced by write-control profiles.)Your OAuth, your machine. Refresh tokens are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest (decryptable only with your MASTER_KEY), writes are deny-by-default, and the server has no telemetry — it connects only to Google's APIs. Found a vulnerability? Report it privately — see SECURITY.md, never a public issue.
Maintainer-led. Direction is tracked publicly as GitHub Milestones (exhaustive API coverage → service accounts + hosting in v6). Not accepting unsolicited feature PRs; bug reports are welcome.
See CONTRIBUTING.md and the Code of Conduct. Security issues go to SECURITY.md, never a public issue.
Built and maintained by Abdelbaki Berkati — berkati.xyz · @bakissation. Read the case study →
Development is funded by IdeaCrafters (@IdeaCraftersHQ) — the studio that pays for this OSS to exist.
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