TIE MCP Server

Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Tenable Identity Exposure API.

Features

• Complete coverage of all 131 TIE API operations (one MCP tool per endpoint)
• Additional convenience tools for discovery, navigation, in-memory AD object search, permission decoding, control-graph attack-path analysis, and a per-identity deviance 360 view (9 custom tools)
• Client-side credential management for security
• Multi-tenant support (multiple TIE environments)
• Granular tool-level security controls
• Auto-generated tool definitions from the OpenAPI specification

Why an MCP server instead of raw API calls?

A thin "call the endpoint" wrapper would just hand the raw TIE API to the model, inheriting the API's shape and its rough edges. This server adds a layer that turns the API into something an LLM can use effectively:

• In-memory AD object search over a cached snapshot. The TIE API has no server-side filter on /api/ad-objects — the only way to find an object by attribute is to page through the entire directory (tens of thousands of objects, dozens of requests). Done naively through the model, that means fetching megabytes of JSON into the context window and paging again on every question. Instead, query_ad_objects scans the directory once, builds a typed in-memory index, and answers expression queries against it in a few milliseconds — reused for ~10 minutes so follow-up questions are effectively free. A lookup that otherwise takes ~50 sequential API calls (and can't even be expressed as a filter) becomes one tool call. See AD object search.
• A real query language. Attributes are decoded into typed values (numbers, booleans, arrays) so admincount>0, badpwdcount>=5, and member:"dcadmin" mean what you'd expect, and can be combined with AND/OR/NOT. The API returns everything as strings and offers no way to combine conditions at all.
• Security-descriptor decoding. AD permissions live in the ntSecurityDescriptor as a dense SDDL string (O:...G:...D:(A;;CCDC...;;;S-1-...)) that is unreadable to a model and useless for reasoning. get_ad_object can decode it on request into structured ACEs with trustee SIDs resolved to names (from the resident snapshot), rights named (GenericAll, WriteDacl, ForceChangePassword…), and object-types resolved via the live schema — turning "who can control this object?" into a readable answer instead of a 15 KB blob. See Permission decoding.
• Cross-object attack-path analysis. Because the whole directory is resident, the server can build a control graph and answer questions no per-object API can: blast radius ("what can this account reach?"), shortest control paths ("how does X become Domain Admin?"), and asset exposure ("who can reach my Tier-0?"). Edges come from group membership, ACL rights, delegation, SID history and more. See Attack-path analysis.
• Per-identity deviance 360. Tenable files each Indicator-of-Exposure deviance against one object, so its own per-object view misses the cases where an identity is the risky trustee buried inside another object's finding, or inherits exposure from a container it sits under. get_identity_360 resolves all three layers (target / trustee / inherited), joins in severity and remediation bands, and deep-links back into the Tenable UI — the exposure picture the console can't assemble on its own. See Identity 360.
• Composed discovery tools. get_topology and get_preferred_profile answer "what forests/domains exist?" and "which profile should I use?" in one call each, instead of the model having to stitch together /infrastructures, /directories, and /preferences and infer how they relate.
• Context-window economy. The model queries and gets back only matching objects (with a reported total and an optional limit), rather than ingesting the whole directory to filter it itself.
• Guardrails. Per-endpoint tools mean the client can allow/deny by name, and TIE_ALLOWED_SAFETY can advertise only read (or read+write) tools — a granularity you don't get by exposing one generic "call any endpoint" tool.

Example use cases

Because search runs in memory, questions that would be impractical as ad-hoc API paging become single natural-language asks. A few that map directly onto query_ad_objects expressions:

• Privileged accounts with weak hygiene — "admins that have had bad password attempts": admincount>0 AND badpwdcount>0.
• Kerberoast exposure — "user accounts that have an SPN set": serviceprincipalname:"/" AND type=LDAP (any SPN contains a /).
• Weak / breached passwords among the privileged — "privileged accounts with a breached password": admincount>0 AND isbreached=true, or a weak password under any profile's policy: admincount>0 AND isweak=true. (These come from TIE's password-hash analysis, joined onto the principal — see Credential weakness.)
• Stale but enabled accounts — combine enabled=true with a lastlogontimestamp bound to surface dormant-yet-active identities.
• Delegation risk sweep — "accounts trusted for delegation": useraccountcontrol:"TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION".
• Fast pivot on one object — "show me everything about Domain Admins": get_ad_object({ samAccountName: "Domain Admins" }), then follow its member list into further queries — all served from the same cached snapshot.

Prompts that combine capabilities

The real leverage is chaining search, permission decoding, the control graph, and credential weakness in one line of questioning. Natural-language prompts an orchestrator can answer by composing these tools:

• "Which non-privileged users can reach Domain Admins, and how?" — get_asset_exposure from the Tier-0 preset (reverse), each with its shortest control path.
• "If bob is phished, what's the blast radius?" — get_blast_radius({ principal: "bob" }); follows group membership, ACL control, delegation, SID history, GPO, and password reuse.
• "What's our true Tier-0 — everyone who can become admin, not just group members?" — get_tier0, which returns built-in privileged groups plus de-facto Tier-0 with the escalation path for each.
• "Who can DCSync the domain, and does any of them have a weak password?" — query_ad_objects("isweak=true") intersected with the DCSync-capable principals surfaced by get_tier0 / a path to the domain node.
• "Show me the shortest way helpdesk could take over the Administrator account." — get_control_paths({ from: "helpdesk", to: "Administrator" }); paths run through domain compromise when that's the real route.
• "Who has dangerous rights on the Domain Admins object?" — get_ad_object({ samAccountName: "Domain Admins", decodeSecurityDescriptor: true }) to read the ACEs with trustees and rights resolved to names.
• "Which admins have a breached OR reused password AND a path to a domain controller?" — query_ad_objects("admincount>0 AND isbreached=true"), then get_blast_radius from each — reused-password clusters and the domain Controls edge do the reachability.
• "Find accounts that are kerberoastable, privileged, and weak all at once." — query_ad_objects('admincount>0 AND serviceprincipalname:"/" AND isweak=true') — the drop-everything findings, in one expression.
• "What's the full exposure picture for jaime.lannister — everything Tenable flags on him, everywhere he's the risky party, sorted worst-first?" — get_identity_360({ samAccountName: "jaime.lannister" }); returns his own deviances plus the ones where he holds dangerous rights over other objects plus what he inherits from his containers, each with a Tenable deeplink.
• "For these 5 users on an attack path, show me each one's Critical/High/Medium/ Low deviance counts." — get_identity_360_summary({ identities: [...] }) in a single call for the badges, then drill into any one with get_identity_360.

Permission decoding

ntSecurityDescriptor is where AD stores who-can-do-what, but it arrives as raw SDDL — a wall of ACE tokens and SIDs that no model can reason over. Pass decodeSecurityDescriptor: true to get_ad_object to get it back as structured, resolved facts:

get_ad_object({ samAccountName: "Domain Admins", decodeSecurityDescriptor: true })
// -> securityDescriptor:
{
  "owner": { "sid": "S-1-5-...-512", "name": "Domain Admins" },
  "aces": [
    { "effect": "Allow", "trustee": { "sid": "S-1-1-0", "name": "Everyone", "broad": true },
      "rights": ["ReadProperty"], "appliesTo": null, "inherited": true },
    { "effect": "Allow", "trustee": { "sid": "S-1-5-...-1105", "name": "bob.shaft", "broad": false },
      "rights": ["ControlAccess"], "appliesTo": "DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All" }
  ]
}

What the decoder does that a raw string can't:

• Resolves trustee SIDs to names using the in-memory snapshot (every object's SID is indexed), and flags broad principals (Everyone, Authenticated Users, Anonymous) with broad: true.
• Names the rights — GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword, AddMember, etc. — and collapses the full-control token run to GenericAll.
• Resolves object-type GUIDs via the live schema already in the store (e.g. the two replication rights that together make up DCSync), so extended rights and attributes show up by name.
• Distinguishes Allow / Deny, marks inherited ACEs, and never throws on a malformed descriptor.

This is deliberately facts, not verdicts — it reports who has which right, and leaves severity to you or to Tenable's Indicators of Exposure. It is also the foundation for the control-graph analysis below; see docs/CONTROL_GRAPH_DESIGN.md.

Credential weakness

TIE runs a password-hash analysis and emits a passwordHashScan companion object per analyzed principal. The server joins that signal back onto the principal (by distinguished name), so credential weakness is directly queryable:

• isbreached — password appears in a breached-password set.
• islmblank / isntblank — blank LM / NT hash.
• isweak — derived boolean: weak under at least one profile's policy. The underlying signal is per-profile (a TIE profile is a configuration lens), and a password is "weak" when it matches a configured weak/dictionary password or is empty / equals the samAccountName. The raw per-profile breakdown is preserved as isweakByProfile ({ profileId: bool }) for finer questions.

query_ad_objects({ expression: "isweak=true AND admincount>0" })       // weak-password admins
query_ad_objects({ expression: "isbreached=true" })                     // breached passwords
// weak specifically under profile 2 (fields are case-insensitive; the raw map
// is matched as a substring):
query_ad_objects({ expression: 'isweakByProfile:"\\"2\\":true"' })

Facts, not verdicts — TIE's Indicators of Exposure already score these findings; this just makes them queryable alongside every other attribute (and, in a planned step, usable as attack-path entry points).

Attack-path analysis (control graph)

A single per-object question ("is this misconfigured?") is what Indicators of Exposure answer. The harder, cross-object question — "by chaining permissions and group memberships, what can this account ultimately reach, and who can reach my crown jewels?" — is a graph problem. From the resident snapshot the server builds a directed control graph whose edges come from both plain attributes and decoded SDDL:

• membership (MemberOf, including primaryGroupID which member omits),
• GenericAll / GenericWrite / WriteDacl / WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, AddKeyCredentialLink (shadow creds),
• DCSync (both replication rights, scoped to the domain head), constrained delegation & RBCD, SIDHistory,
• Contains (container → child) and GpoAppliesTo (GPO → linked OU), so GPO-based control chains down to affected objects, and
• Controls (domain → in-domain principal): the "domain compromise owns everything in the domain" primitive, synthesized at query time so paths continue through a domain takeover to a specific target. Example: unpriv → owns GPO → GpoAppliesTo OU → Contains user → DCSync → domain → Controls → Administrator, and
• ReusedPassword (principal ↔ shared-password hub): principals sharing a password hash (from TIE's reuse analysis) cluster on a hub node, so compromising one reaches everyone who shares the credential.

Three tools traverse it — all shortest-path (BFS), depth/breadth-capped, and cycle-safe:

// Forward: if this account is compromised, what can it reach?
get_blast_radius({ principal: "bob", maxDepth: 6 })

// Targeted: how can X reach Y? Returns the edge chain.
get_control_paths({ from: "bob", to: "Domain Admins" })
// -> bob -MemberOf-> Helpdesk -GenericAll-> dcadmin -MemberOf-> Domain Admins

// Reverse: who can reach this asset / the Tier-0 set?
get_asset_exposure({})                       // Tier-0 preset (privileged groups)
get_asset_exposure({ targets: ["CN=FileServer01,..."] })

// Derived Tier-0: privileged groups PLUS everyone who can become privileged,
// each with its escalation path. "What is my true Tier-0 attack surface?"
get_tier0({})

Notes and honest limits:

• Directory-control edges only. This is the credential-less slice — it does not include logon sessions or local-admin (those need live host collectors, à la BloodHound). A path here is a directory-control path, so a 0-path result means "no control path", not "no attack path of any kind".
• Facts, not verdicts. Results report reachability and the exact edge chain, never a severity score.
• Guardrails. maxDepth (default 6) and maxNodes bound traversal, and a hit cap is reported as truncated: "depth" | "nodes" — never silently, since under-reporting in a security tool is dangerous.
• On-demand build. The graph is built from the in-memory snapshot with no extra API calls. Set TIE_BUILD_GRAPH=true to build it in the background at startup; otherwise the first graph query builds it (and may take tens of seconds on a large tenant). See docs/CONTROL_GRAPH_DESIGN.md.

Identity 360 (deviance view)

Indicators of Exposure are how Tenable flags misconfigurations, but each deviance is filed against exactly one object — usually the victim. That makes a "what is this identity exposed to?" question surprisingly hard to answer from the console, because the same identity can be dangerous or exposed in three different ways that the per-object view never unifies. get_identity_360 resolves all three layers for one object:

1. target — deviances Tenable filed directly on the object (its own view).
2. trustee — deviances where the object is the risky principal embedded in another object's finding (e.g. the trustee inside a Dangerous-ACE list on a victim, or on a root partition). These never appear under the object in Tenable, because the deviance belongs to the victim.
3. inherited — deviances on a container / partition the object sits under, whose exposure inherits down; resolved by walking up the control graph's Contains edges (builds the graph on first use).

Each returned deviance is self-contained and enriched: checker + reason metadata, the severity (raw O-CRITICITY and the Critical/High/Medium/Low band), the remediation cost (raw and Low/Medium/High band), the related counterpart object (for trustee/inherited layers), granted rights, resolved/ ignored state, and a deeplink into the Tenable IOE page plus a deeplinkFilterHint (id:"<adObjectId>") to narrow the on-page filter to the exact object. Results are sorted worst-first (severity band, then raw criticity, then remediation cost).

// Full, sorted, deep-linked findings for one identity (all three layers).
get_identity_360({ samAccountName: "jaime.lannister" })

// Batch roll-up: per-identity counts by severity band (for report badges),
// NO full lists. Mix DN / SID / samAccountName / objectId; unresolved inputs
// come back flagged rather than failing the batch.
get_identity_360_summary({ identities: ["jaime.lannister", "S-1-5-...", 44656] })

Notes:

• Severity is profile-specific. O-CRITICITY and O-ENABLED are per-profile (and can be overridden per-directory); omit profileId to use your preferred profile. Deviances from checkers disabled in the profile/directory are excluded by default and reported in a separate summary.suppressed tally — so nothing is silently dropped.
• Cached deviance index. All deviances are scanned once (profile-scoped) and cached behind the same TTL as the object snapshot; refresh: true forces a rescan. The summary and detail tools share the index, so a badge from get_identity_360_summary always matches the expanded get_identity_360 view.
• Facts, not verdicts. The tools translate Tenable's own numbers into bands and surface the relationships; they don't re-score risk.

Freshness and caching

The snapshot is cached for 1 day by default (TIE_CACHE_TTL_MS to change it) and is not live — it reflects the directory as of the last scan. This is deliberate: a full scan is expensive, and AD/TIE state changes slowly relative to a working session, so cheap reuse is the right default. Consequences to know:

• Every query/lookup response includes a snapshot block reporting the cache's object count, ageMs, and ttlMs, and both tool descriptions tell the model the data may be stale — so it can decide when currency matters.
• To force current data, pass refresh: true on query_ad_objects or get_ad_object. The classic trap: run a query, fix something in TIE, re-query, and see the old data because you didn't refresh.
• When the TTL lapses, the next query transparently rescans (no action needed).

Startup warming (on by default): the full directory scan can take tens of seconds to ~100s on a large tenant. To keep that off the critical path, the server warms the snapshot in the background at startup — after connect(), so it never delays startup, and a query arriving mid-scan simply joins the in-flight build (no double scan). By the time you run your first search the cache is usually already warm. Two further points:

• Progress notifications. If the MCP client attaches a progressToken to a call that does trigger a scan, the server emits notifications/progress once per fetched page (e.g. "Scanning AD objects: 12000 loaded (12 pages)"), so a long scan isn't silent. Clients that don't request progress simply see one longer tool call.
• Disabling warming. Set TIE_WARM_CACHE=false to skip the startup scan — useful on a tenant you never search, or to reduce load when running many server instances. The snapshot then builds lazily on the first query instead. A failed background warm (e.g. TIE unreachable at startup) is caught and logged, and also falls back to lazy build — it never crashes the server.

Installation

The server runs as a local subprocess of your MCP client and communicates over stdio. Choose one of the following.

Option A — npx (recommended, once published)

No local clone or build. Reference it directly from your MCP client config (see Configuration):

{ "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "tie-mcp-server"] }

Option B — from source

git clone <repo-url> tie-mcp-server
cd tie-mcp-server
npm install        # also builds via the `prepare` script
npm run build      # (re-run after any source change)

Then point your client at the built entry point, e.g. node /absolute/path/to/tie-mcp-server/build/index.js.

Option C — Docker

A multi-stage Dockerfile is provided for users who prefer not to install Node locally. Build the image:

docker build -t tie-mcp-server .

Because the server speaks MCP over stdio, the container must be run interactively (-i) with credentials passed as environment variables:

{
  "command": "docker",
  "args": [
    "run", "-i", "--rm",
    "-e", "TIE_BASE_URL",
    "-e", "TIE_API_KEY",
    "tie-mcp-server"
  ],
  "env": {
    "TIE_BASE_URL": "https://customer.tenable.ad",
    "TIE_API_KEY": "your-api-key-here"
  }
}

Note: This is a per-user local tool using stdio transport, so Docker Compose is not applicable (there is no long-running network service to orchestrate). Docker is offered only to bundle the Node runtime. If you need a centrally-hosted, multi-client gateway, that requires switching to MCP's HTTP/SSE transport first — see Hosting as a shared service.

Configuration

The MCP server requires two environment variables:

• TIE_BASE_URL - Your TIE instance URL (e.g., https://customer.tenable.ad)
• TIE_API_KEY - Your TIE API key

Optional environment variables:

• TIE_ALLOWED_SAFETY - Comma-separated safety tiers to advertise (read, read,write); see Server-side safety filter.
• TIE_WARM_CACHE - Build the AD-object search snapshot at startup instead of on first query. On by default; set to false to disable (see AD object search).
• TIE_CACHE_TTL_MS - How long the AD-object snapshot stays fresh, in ms (default 86400000, i.e. 1 day). Lower it to trade scan cost for freshness.
• TIE_BUILD_GRAPH - true to build the control graph (attack-path / blast- radius / asset-exposure edges) in the background after the snapshot warms. Off by default; adds CPU + memory. Query tools land in a later release.
• TIE_TIMEOUT - Per-request timeout in ms (default 30000).
• TIE_MAX_RETRIES - Max request retries (default 3).

Single Environment Setup

Add to your MCP client configuration (e.g., ~/.claude/settings.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tie": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/tie-mcp-server/build/index.js"],
      "env": {
        "TIE_BASE_URL": "https://customer.tenable.ad",
        "TIE_API_KEY": "your-api-key-here"
      }
    }
  }
}

Multiple Environments Setup

For multiple TIE environments, add multiple server instances:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tie-prod": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/tie-mcp-server/build/index.js"],
      "env": {
        "TIE_BASE_URL": "https://prod.tenable.ad",
        "TIE_API_KEY": "prod-key"
      }
    },
    "tie-staging": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/tie-mcp-server/build/index.js"],
      "env": {
        "TIE_BASE_URL": "https://staging.tenable.ad",
        "TIE_API_KEY": "staging-key"
      }
    }
  }
}

Development

# Install dependencies
npm install

# Regenerate tool definitions from the OpenAPI spec (writes src/generated/tools.ts)
npm run generate:tools

# (Optional) Generate TypeScript API types from the OpenAPI spec
npm run generate:client

# Build the project
npm run build

# Watch mode for development
npm run watch

# Run without building (development)
npm run dev

# Type checking
npm run typecheck

# Linting
npm run lint

Security

Client-Side Credentials

Credentials are never stored in the MCP server code. They must be configured on the client side (MCP client config) and passed as environment variables to the server process.

Tool-Level Filtering

Organizations can filter tools by operation type for granular security control:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tie": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/tie-mcp-server/build/index.js"],
      "env": {
        "TIE_BASE_URL": "https://customer.tenable.ad",
        "TIE_API_KEY": "key"
      },
      "allowedTools": ["get_*", "list_*", "search_*"],
      "deniedTools": ["delete_*"]
    }
  }
}

Tool categories by risk level (the safety field on each generated descriptor):

• 🟢 read (70 tools): get_*, list_*, search_*, export_*
• 🟡 write (51 tools): create_*, update_*, set_*, plus actions like commit_*, login
• 🔴 destructive (10 tools): delete_*, unstage_*

Server-side safety filter

Beyond the client's allowedTools/deniedTools, the server itself honors a TIE_ALLOWED_SAFETY environment variable. Set it to a comma-separated list of tiers to advertise only those tools — e.g. read for a strictly read-only deployment, or read,write to disable destructive operations entirely:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tie-readonly": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/tie-mcp-server/build/index.js"],
      "env": {
        "TIE_BASE_URL": "https://customer.tenable.ad",
        "TIE_API_KEY": "key",
        "TIE_ALLOWED_SAFETY": "read"
      }
    }
  }
}

Architecture

Rather than hand-writing a handler per endpoint, tool definitions are generated from the OpenAPI spec into a single data file, and one generic dispatcher turns any descriptor + arguments into an HTTP request.

scripts/
└── generate-tools.mjs    # Parses the OpenAPI spec -> src/generated/tools.ts
src/
├── index.ts              # MCP server: registers tools, routes calls
├── config.ts             # Environment configuration
├── client.ts             # HTTP client for TIE API (axios)
├── dispatch.ts           # Generic descriptor -> HTTP request dispatcher
├── custom-tools.ts       # Hand-written convenience/discovery tools
└── generated/            # Auto-generated — do not edit by hand
    └── tools.ts          # 131 ToolDescriptor entries (name, method, path, schema)

Generated vs Custom Tools

Generated tools (src/generated/tools.ts): One-to-one mappings of TIE API endpoints. Regenerate whenever the TIE API spec changes:

npm run generate:tools

Custom tools (src/custom-tools.ts): Hand-written convenience tools that compose multiple API calls or provide discovery/navigation helpers. These survive regeneration and are merged with generated tools at server startup.

Current custom tools:

• get_topology - Returns Infrastructure→Directory hierarchy tree
• get_preferred_profile - Returns user's default profile from preferences
• query_ad_objects - Search all AD objects with a filter expression, run in memory over a cached snapshot (see AD object search)
• get_ad_object - Look up a single AD object by DN, SID, or SAM account name

Custom tools follow the same CustomTool interface ({name, description, category, safety, inputSchema, handler}) and are dispatched alongside generated tools.

Available Tools

The server exposes 139 tools total:

• 131 generated tools from src/generated/tools.ts (one per TIE API endpoint)
• 8 custom tools from src/custom-tools.ts (get_topology, get_preferred_profile, query_ad_objects, get_ad_object, get_blast_radius, get_control_paths, get_asset_exposure, get_tier0)

See TOOL_NAMING_CONVENTION.md for the naming scheme and the (historical) 88-endpoint reference list.

Discovery Tools

// Get user's preferred profile (from preferences)
get_preferred_profile()
// Returns: { preferredProfileId: 2, preferredProfileName: "Contoso" }

// Get infrastructure→directory topology tree
get_topology()
// Returns: [{ id, name, directories: [{id, name, status}] }]

AD object search

query_ad_objects and get_ad_object solve a real limitation: the TIE API has no server-side filter on /api/ad-objects, so the only way to find objects by attribute is to page through the entire directory (tens of thousands of objects). These tools do that scan once, build a typed in-memory snapshot, and reuse it (TTL-cached, default 10 minutes) so subsequent searches run in a few milliseconds without re-paging.

// Filter expression: FIELD OP VALUE, combined with AND / OR / NOT and parentheses.
query_ad_objects({
  expression: '(admincount>0 AND useraccountcontrol:"NORMAL") OR badpwdcount>=5',
  limit: 50,          // optional; 0 = all. Total match count is always reported.
})

// Single-object lookup by DN, SID, or SAM account name.
get_ad_object({ distinguishedName: "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=alsid,DC=corp" })
get_ad_object({ sid: "S-1-5-21-...-512" })
get_ad_object({ samAccountName: "Domain Admins" })

Operators

Fields are attribute names (case-insensitive), e.g. admincount, cn, member, useraccountcontrol, isbreached, plus the identity fields type (LDAP/SYSVOL), directoryId, objectId, id. Quote values containing spaces: cn:"Domain Admins". Multi-valued attributes match if any value matches; a missing attribute never matches. Pass refresh: true to force a fresh scan.

Note: useraccountcontrol is exposed as decoded flag names ("NORMAL DONT_EXPIRE"), not the raw integer bitmask — test flags with the : contains operator (e.g. useraccountcontrol:"DONT_EXPIRE"), not &.

Generated Tool Examples

// Get system information
get_about()

// List attacks for a profile
list_attacks({ profileId: "profile-123" })

// Search events
search_events({
  query: { /* search criteria */ }
})

// Create infrastructure
create_infrastructure({
  name: "Production",
  description: "Production environment"
})

// Update deviance
update_deviance({
  infrastructureId: "infra-1",
  directoryId: "dir-1",
  devianceId: "dev-1",
  data: { status: "resolved" }
})

Hosting as a shared service

This server currently uses stdio transport: the MCP client spawns it as a local child process. That model is correct for a per-user desktop tool and is why distribution is via npm/npx (or a plain Docker image), not Docker Compose.

To instead run one centrally-hosted instance that many remote clients connect to, the server would need to switch to MCP's streamable HTTP/SSE transport (replacing StdioServerTransport in src/index.ts with the HTTP server transport and adding a listening port). At that point it becomes a standing network service, and Docker — optionally with Compose behind a reverse proxy for TLS and authentication — becomes the appropriate deployment. This is a deliberate, separate change and is not implemented today.

API Documentation

• API Endpoints
• Tool Naming Convention
• Authentication
• Architecture Options

License

MIT — see LICENSE.